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 Abstract 
This paper uses bank-level data and macroeconomic indicators to assess the following 
two questions: (1) Does the external environment influence the occurrence of failure of 
small banks? (2) To what extent macroeconomic indicators improve bankruptcy 
prediction? These issues are addressed for the Italian Cooperative Banks using an 
unbalanced panel model. The results show that local economic environment is a 
significant determinant of model bank failures. 
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1 Introduction  
The recent financial turmoil has renewed the attention of governments and financial 
authorities on the endemic risks associated to banking operations. The reluctance of 
banks to lend to each other together with less liquid financial markets has brought to an 
increase in the number of failures of financial institutions. As a consequence, it is of 
utmost importance to further explore the causes behind bank distress.  
This paper presents an innovative study related to the analysis of the determinants of 
failure for small banks. The investigation clarifies the relationship between the specific 
characteristics of small banks and their probability of failure. The issue is of particular 
relevance for the socio-economic role of this type of financial institutions and for the 
relevant output losses generated at local level. Thus, the present analysis develops a 
default predictive model using the panel data technique. 
This study focuses on small banks for two main reasons. First, these credit institutions 
play an important role at a local and national level. For instance, European cooperative 
banks serve more than 176 million clients, manage over EUR 5 trillion in assets and hold 
a deposits and credits market share of 19% and 20% respectively1. Second, a few studies 
provide a comprehensive picture of the main determinants of risk for small banks. In 
particular, there is a little knowledge about the relationship between their probability of 
default2 and the local economic conditions.  
From a theoretical point of view, banks are affected by the economy in which they do 
business. The relevant economic conditions for small banks are local due to the limited 
geographic market and legal restrictions. Cooperative model - as a distinct business 
model - exposes the banks to the cyclical fluctuations of the national and local economy 
(Caratelli et al., 2008). Hence, the research explores whether nonbank economic data can 
be used to improve forecasts of small bank health.  
                                                        
1
  Source of data: European Association of Cooperative Banks (EACB), key statistics as on 31-12-2009. 
2
  In this article the term default will, except where otherwise noted, refer to the definition adopted in the estimation 
of the model (see §3). 
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The analysis employs the panel data technique to show that cooperative failures 
prediction is statistically related to macroeconomic variables and bank-level 
fundamentals. The focus is on Italian cooperative banks (CBs)3 since this case is 
particularly interesting to analyze the link between small banks and the local economic 
environment. Hence the study shows that the inflation rate and the growth in personal 
income are statistically significant and affects positively the probability of default. As a 
result, this finding will contribute to the growing literature of explaining the causes of 
banking distress and it will allow formulating related policies in order to head off or limit 
direct and indirect costs caused by banking distress. 
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 briefly reviews the relevant 
literature. Section 3 deals with the method and provides the description of the procedure 
utilized for the model specification. Section 4 details the data used for the estimation and 
the sample description. Section 5 reports the results of the analysis and Section 6 
illustrate the robustness check. Section 7 concludes and gives the final remarks. 
2 Selected literature  
Although there are a handful of studies on bank failures and banking crisis, there seems 
to be two separate streams in the empirical literature4: the “micro” and the “macro” 
camps. The “micro” approach focuses in general on individual banks’ balance sheet data, 
possibly augmented with market data, to predict bank failure. The “macro” approach 
explains the banking crises examining the macroeconomic determinants. These studies 
typically analyze a large sample of countries trying to find out which macroeconomic 
variables signal the happening of a banking crisis in advance. Several works have been 
done in both areas but a few have tried to combine the two approaches together. 
Bankruptcy predictions aiming at detecting individual failures using financial ratios have 
become important research topics after the pioneeristic research of Altman (1968) and 
                                                        
3
  For the sake of simplicity, the term “Italian Cooperative Banks” or “Cooperatives”  or “CBs” stands for: 
1. Banche di credito cooperativo; 
2. Casse rurali; 
3. Casse Raiffeisen. 
4
 Gonzalez-Hermosillo (1999). 
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Beaver (1966). These studies try to discriminate between sound and unsound 
institutions using accounting data. Soon after their introduction, several studies test the 
predictive ability of financial ratios to detect the financial health of bank operations 
(among others, Meyer and Pifer, 1970; Sinkey, 1975; Santomero and Visno, 1977; 
Estrella et al. , 2000). In the same vein many other works aim at testing the superiority of 
a specific technique with respect to another (Martin, 1977; Espahbodi, 1991; Shumway, 
2001; Glennon et al. , 2002; Boyacioglu et al. ,2009). Other researchers focus on the usage 
of specific variables to predict bank failures. Gonzalez-Hermosillo (1999) analyzes the 
role of both micro and macro factors in the occurrence of banking system distress in the 
United States, Mexico and Colombia in the 1980s and 1990s. Using panel data and 
duration model, the author argues that bank-specific variables seem to capture the 
fundamental sources of ex-ante risk. Then, the introduction of the macroeconomic or 
regional variables enhances the predictive power of the models based on bank-specific 
data only.  Furthermore, Ioannidis et al. (2010) find that the use of country-level variable 
significantly improve the classification accuracies of the models. Also Arena (2008) 
suggests that systemic macroeconomic and liquidity shocks not only destabilize the 
banks that were already weak before the crises, but also the relatively stronger banks ex-
ante. This result suggests that even strong banks can be particularly affected by the 
negative effects triggered by systemic crises.  
The usage of macroeconomic information in default predicting models is still under 
debate. Several works have attempted to determine if and under which conditions 
environmental influences affect banks’ likelihood of failure (Daly et al., 2004; Yeager, 
2004; Nuxoll et al., 2003). Just a few of those studies have introduced some 
macroeconomic/regional factors as explanatory variables for individual bank failures (i.e. 
Nuxoll, 2003; Porath, 2006). Furthermore, studies that look at the banking system as a 
whole often employ a heterogeneous set of control variables. For instance, Demirguc-
Kunt and Detragiache (1998) underline that elements of the macroeconomic 
environment, such GDP growth, excessively high real interest rates and high inflation, 
significantly increase the likelihood of systemic banking crises. Also Männasooa and 
Mayes (2009) test a theoretical framework in which a combination of macroeconomic, 
structural and bank-specific factors is able to predict banking distress in the European 
transition countries. 
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A few studies have assessed the probability of default of the Italian cooperative banks.  
For instance, Fiordelisi and Mare (2011) investigate the link between efficiency and the 
probability of bank survival. However, as far as the author is aware, no one has assessed 
the contribution of the local macroeconomic environment on bank operations. This fact 
gives room to the present research on the light of the systemic threat represented by the 
failure of individual banks. 
3 The empirical study 
Bank distress is often related to a set of different elements that affect bank operations. In 
the present study, the failure depends on internal (i.e. managerial risks) and external (i.e. 
economic environment) conditions that trigger the event of the default. Moreover, the 
focus is on the factors that are not directly under the control of the bank management.  
3.1 Definition of failure 
In line with previous studies (Arena, 2008; Gonzalez-Hermosillo et al., 1997; Männasooa 
and Mayes, 2009), bank failure is associated with public intervention. The Italian 
insolvency regime establishes that major companies (groups) experiencing financial 
distress, might be subject to both the Extraordinary Administration and the Liquidation 
Procedure. The former procedure is a going-concern contingent measure that aims at 
restructuring and reorganizing the enterprise while protecting the company from 
creditor action. The latter is a gone-concern action in which the insolvent bank has to be 
shut down.  
A bank is classified as being in default if it underwent any of the following procedures 
between January 1st 1999 and December 31st 2006: 
1. it entered the extraordinary administration; 
2. it entered liquidation. 
In the analysis, a bank is considered to have failed if it is opened one of the two 
aforementioned procedures. Moreover, for the sake of simplicity, it is assumed that 
default can only occur at discrete points in time (t = year 1, year 2, etc.). The definition 
constitutes an objective indication of a bank's inability to continue its operations or a 
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temporary instability. Moreover, it permits to have a reasonable number of observations 
(i.e. 34) in order to draw the statistical inference from the data.  
< Insert Table 1 > 
As it is noticed from Table 1, the number of BCCs have been diminishing from 1997 to 
2004. This effect is mainly due to the process of concentration witnessed in recent years 
in the Italian banking sector. In fact, considering the total of number of banks 
disappeared from 1997 to 2004 (146), 65% have merged or have been acquired by other 
banks. Moreover, of the 50 cases of default, 28 ended with a merger or acquisition 
favored by the intervention of the regulatory supervisor (Bank of Italy). 
3.2 Methodology  
The risk of failure is assessed using an unbalanced panel binary response model. The 
choice seems the more appropriate because of the nature of bankruptcy data (Shumway, 
2001). The specific feature of panel data is the possibility of following the same 
individuals over time, which facilitates the analysis of dynamic responses and the control 
of unobserved heterogeneity (Arellano, 2003)5. Moreover, this technique permits to 
utilise bank-specific and macroeconomic variables simultaneously and it helps to 
forecast future financial condition and to focus on risk categories.  
The estimated probabilities are obtained using the traditional random effects model6: 
ititit uSy +=            (1) 
With: 
∑
=
++=
p
j
iitjit cXS
1
0 ββ          (2) 
Where Sit is the score that constitutes an order of the banks according to their riskiness 
and uit is the unobserved, individual specific heterogeneity. Xit is a vector (p x 1) that can 
contain a variety of factors, including lagged variables (Wooldridge, 2002).  β is the 
correspondent (1 x p) vector of coefficients and it measures the effect on the probability 
                                                        
5
 Heterogeneity arises since we are dealing with different individuals (banks). 
6
 Wooldridge, 2002. 
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of bank failure of a unit change in the corresponding independent variables. Ci is the 
(unobserved) heterogeneity. 
The estimated response probabilities are given by: 
)()|1( itititit SFxyP === λ          (3) 
where λit is the probability of default (PD) of bank i at time t. The link function F 
transforms the score into the PD. This model explicitly assumes that some omitted 
variables may be constant over time but vary between cases, and others may be fixed 
between cases but vary over time.  
The choice of F(.) determines how the coefficients βj are estimated. Two different link 
factions are used (logistic and standard normal). We have then the unobserved effects 
probit and its logit counterpart. A fixed effects probit analysis is not possible since it 
leads to incidental parameters problem (Wooldridge, 2002). Then, the traditional 
random effects model is estimated by using the procedure employed by Butler and 
Moffitt (1982). The conditional MLE in this context is called the random effects probit 
estimator (Wooldridge, 2002). The unobserved logit model has an important advantage 
over the probit model since it is possible to obtain N -consistent estimator of β. In this 
case, using the procedure implemented by Chamberlain (1984), we can estimate the 
fixed effects logit estimator. However, as already noticed in some studies (Porath, 2006; 
Davis and Karim, 2008), this procedure cannot be utilized since only defaulted banks 
would contribute to the log likelihood and excluding non default banks would generate a 
biased sample and biased coefficients.  Therefore, also for the logit model, we obtain the 
estimated coefficients by using the random effects logit estimator. 
Following the ex-post empirical approach employed in previous bank failure studies 
(Espahbodi, 1991; Glennon et al., 2002; Martin, 1977), the explanatory variables (Xit) are 
drawn from data for a time period prior to failure. The characteristics of the 
predetermined groups (sound and defaulted banks) are compared considering a time lag 
permitting to examine the dynamic behaviour. According to the procedure utilized by 
Gilbert et al. (1999), it is assumed a two year lag (Xit-2) as default events are often the 
result of the balance sheet audit (Porath, 2006). Thus, the resulting function relates the 
probability of default in period t to the control variables of period t-2. The econometric 
model then predicts the likelihood that a bank, currently considered safe and sound, 
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enters default in a period between 12 and 24 months. This procedure permits to have at 
least a one-year forecast horizon and to include in the analysis a minimum number of 
failures (34)7. The model for two years before failure could be used to predict whether a 
given bank will fail in the future.  
A vector of explanatory variables Xit (X1t,X2t,...,Xpt) corresponds to each dependent 
variable (Yit). The database of the independent variables contains the information 
(macroeconomic and accounting data) for different individuals (banks) at a given point 
in time across time (different years). 
3.3 Determinants of small bank failures 
The set of potentially explanatory variables is chosen considering previous similar 
empirical studies or taking into account the specific characteristics of the cooperative 
banks. The ratios belong to two broad categories: 
1. macroeconomic determinants; 
2. bank-level fundamentals. 
The first group seeks to gauge the impact of the economic environment on the riskiness 
of the banks and is the objective of the study. The underlying assumption is that 
economic variables proxy the increase in the risk of the environment in which 
Cooperatives operate. Since diversification is not an option due to specific restrictions to 
Cooperatives’ business activities, adverse local economic conditions increase the 
vulnerability of Cooperatives to local exogenous financial shocks. 
Bank specific factors are used to control for the effect of other elements that provide 
information on the early warning of distress. These ratios, derived from bank accounting 
information, give forewarning of safety-and-soundness problems. To ensure coverage of 
the most important aspects of bank vulnerability, CAMEL-type8 variables are used as 
                                                        
7
 By considering a one-year lag, the number of default decreases to 27; in the case of a three-year lag the figure is 25. 
The decrease in the number of default is given by the unavailability of the financial statements (especially when 
considering a one-year lag). 
8
 CAMELS is the acronym referring to the following six factors traditionally examined by US baking regulators: “C” 
stands for Capital adequacy, “A” for Asset quality, “M” for the quality of Management ,“E” refers to Earnings and “L” to 
Liquidity. 
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input variables, which are in turn associated to five critical dimensions of banks’ 
operations: liquidity (i.e. liquidity risk), performance (i.e efficiency), risk (i.e credit risk), 
profitability (i.e. return on equity investment), balance sheet structure (i.e. sources of 
funding) and capital adequacy (i.e adequacy). This classification is drawn in order to 
control for bank “internal elements” that affect its probability of default. Furthermore, it 
permits to give an explicit indication and economic meaning to the numerical output of 
the model.  
The absence of a clear theory on banking financial crisis makes the choice of the input 
variables arbitrary. In fact, rather than the causes, financial ratios provide information 
about the symptoms of financial difficulty (Arena, 2008). Nevertheless, accounting data 
is used as a measure of the potential to failure giving the “tangible” results expressed by 
the bank financial statements. 
The list of the 57 covariates is built from the above mentioned categories9. Quality 
factors are omitted (i.e. management quality) from the analysis since they could not be 
measured adequately with the available data.  From the original list of selected 
accounting indicators, a subset of variables is chosen using quantitative and qualitative 
criteria. The goal of this analysis is to select the “most informative” subset of 
independent variables which has the best “discriminatory ability”. In addition, in a 
multivariate framework, it is desirable that each ratio conveys as much additional 
information as possible. Finally, a subset selection guarantees some properties of the 
estimators and permits to draw some inference on the relationship between each 
category and the probability of default (Espahbodi, 1991). It also enhances the simplicity 
of the model throughout the parsimony of the parameters. 
< Insert Table 2 > 
4 Data and sample description  
The initial time window considers the period 1997-2009. Year 2005 has been excluded 
since during 2007 no events of default were observed. Years 2006, 2007, 2008 and 2009 
have not been considered in the estimation since from 1/01/2006 CBs have adopted the 
                                                        
9
 The variable names and definitions, along with some descriptive statistics, are available upon request to the author. 
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International Accounting Standards (IAS). The adoption of IAS changes key financial 
measures and the value relevance of financial statement information, making the data 
prior and after the introduction of the new standards not homogeneous.  Therefore, the 
sample set covers the period 1997 through 2004. 
The original data set (3,832 observations) has been cleaned and organized to get a more 
homogeneous sample in order to be able to apply the proposed methodology. Hence, the 
resulting total number of observations included in the estimation is 3,748.  
The sample consists of 604 individuals (banks). The number of observations per group 
ranged from 1 to 8. In particular, the participation pattern of the cross-sectional time-
series data denotes that for each individual in the sample, data are not available for all 
the years. 
<Insert Table 3 > 
Looking at the geographical distribution of the CBs, almost half of them are located in a 
single geographical area (North-West 44%) and almost one-fourth in only one region 
(Trentino Alto-Adige). The total number of CBs is decreasing across years due mostly to 
operation of merger and acquisition. 
<Insert Table 4 > 
In terms of average total assets and number of branches, the Cooperatives in the North-
West have a bigger size than CBs located in the other areas, especially compared to CBs 
in the South. The average total assets show a positive trend across the areas over the 
years. CBs in the North-East present the highest growth (138%) whilst CBs in the South 
show lower growth (121%) and lower average number of branches over the period. 
< Insert Figure 1 > 
The data set for the explanatory variables combines accounting with macroeconomic 
information. Market information is not considered since CBs are not publicly traded and 
there is very little other market information available10. The financial ratios that are 
investigated as potential leading indicators of failure are drawn from the banks’ financial 
statements. Data are publicly available for most key items - the liquidity position, balance 
                                                        
10
 A few CBs are provided with credit ratings by credit rating agencies. 
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sheet, profit and loss, off-balance sheet items, large depositors and large exposures. The 
major gaps are information on the sectoral pattern of their lending (including exposures 
to the property sector) and the interest rates on their liabilities and assets. 
Macroeconomic information is obtained from the Italian National Institute of Statistics 
(Istat), the Bank of Italy and the Ministry of Interior.  
5 Results 
The model takes into account the sample unobserved heterogeneity. The purpose is to 
analyze the relationship between the macroeconomic variables and the probability of 
default. The coefficients obtained from regressing the dummy variable on 
macroeconomic and accounting information shed some light on the significance of the 
relationship between the regressors and the probability of failure. Moreover, the usage 
of different techniques of estimation guarantees more robust results. 
< Insert Table 6 > 
The results are pretty similar using the logit and the probit model giving more robust 
inference.  
The signs of the coefficients are the same across models. Both the macroeconomic 
variables are positively related with the probability of default. The positive sign of the 
inflation rate denotes that banking crises tend to be high in number when the 
macroeconomic environment is weak, particularly when the inflation rate is high 
(Canbas et al., 2005; Demirguc-Kunt and Detragiache, 1998). The relationship between 
growth in personal income and the event of default is not of immediate perception. 
Nevertheless, losses incurred in the banking sector con be larger when a downturn is 
preceded by particular favorable macroeconomic conditions (i.e. excess credit growth11). 
Moreover, if this environmental variable serves as a proxy for the local demand structure 
(Hahn, 2007), banks which operate in richer region face an external environment which 
is likely to foster banking efficiency, in that lowering the probability of default. On the 
other hand, external competition raises costs12 and a positive sign of the coefficient 
                                                        
11
 The so called Basel III regulatory framework (Basel III: A global regulatory framework for more resilient banks and 
banking systems,2010) explicitly takes into account specific measures to avoid excess credit growth and procyclicality. 
12
  For instance, the cost associated to high-quality personnel (Hahn, 2007). 
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suggests that an increase in the environmental variable generates an increase in costs 
that raises the probability of default (Glass and McKillop, 2006).  
In all equations, bank-level data that proxy balance-sheet structure, capital adequacy, 
performance and liquidity are significant at the 5% level. The profitability and risk ratios 
are not statistically significant in all regressions. This result should be related to the 
extent of which profitability influences the management of these small banks. The BCC 
ownership structure together with the mutualistic nature of these banks imply that 
profits are not the only main target for the management. This relaxes the traditional view 
that sees shareholders setting financial goals that management must achieve. Also the 
risk ratio is dropped from the analysis as not statistically significant. This can be 
attributing to the relationship between the worsening of the real economy conditions 
and the ability of debtors to repay their debts. An increase in the loan-loss provisions 
relative to the amount of riskiest loans generates an increase in riskiness, thus the 
relationship with the event of default is positive. An increase in the profit after tax 
relative to the total assets indicates an increase in profitability, thus the relationship with 
the event of default is negative. The capital structure gives an index of the fraction of the 
total assets that provides interest income. The higher the portion of interest bearing 
assets, the lower will be the probability of default. A high percentage of regulatory free 
capital13 is again associated with low risk. This relative measure indicates that the the 
larger the capital buffer against losses, the lower the probability of failure. A higher level 
of staff costs is correlated with a lower level of risk as more qualified employees add 
value to the banks. The liquidity ratio represents an indication of a company's ability to 
meet short-term debt obligations; the higher the ratio, the lower is the ability to meet 
unexpected liquidity needs.  
The results of the estimation are in line with previous studies as underlined in the 
following table. 
< Insert Table 7 > 
                                                        
13
  In this case, percentage of regulatory free capital refers to the capital in excess with respect to the regulatory capital. 
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6 Model performance 
The analysis of the goodness-of-fit permits to address how well the statistical model fits 
the observed phenomena. Several measures are employed for measuring the success rate 
and the accurateness of the estimation in-sample. In addition, an analysis of robustness 
is performed to test some general assumptions of the model. Without loss of generality, 
such measures are calculated for the models in which all the explanatory variables are 
significantly related with the event of default.  
The estimated probability of default is utilized to distinguish failed from non-failed banks. 
A given bank is classified as failed if its posterior probability of failure is greater than an 
optimum cut-off point14. It is then possible the comparison between this classification 
and the actual outcome of the event of default. In particular, sensitivity and specificity 
are the statistical measures employed to evaluate the response of the model. Sensitivity 
measures the proportion of actual positives which are correctly identified as such (the 
percentage of observed defaulted banks that are classified in default by the model). 
Specificity quantifies the proportion of negatives which are correctly identified (the 
percentage of healthy banks that are identified as being such). The overall accurateness 
of the estimate is evaluated through the percentage of correctly classified observations15 
and the McFadden’s pseudo R-squared16. In addition, the ROC area, the Brier score17 and 
the Wilks’ Lambda18 are utilized for the assessment of discriminatory power. 
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 This threshold was fixed at the level of the given sample prior probability of failure. In general, the optimum cut-off 
point depends on the prior probability of failure, the decision context of interest and on an appropriate pay-off 
function (Espahbodi 1991).  
15
 Percentage of times the predicted yit matched the actual yit. 
16
  The McFadden’s pseudo R2 compares the likelihood for the intercept only model to the likelihood for the model with 
the predictors: 
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where MFull is the model with the predictors, MIntercept is the model with only the intercept and 
∧
L is the estimated 
likelihood. This measure provides information on the level of improvement over the intercept model offered by the full 
model. The higher the ratio the higher the total variability explained by the model. 
17
  The Brier score evaluates the quality of the forecast of a probability. It is defined as:  
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< Insert Table 8 > 
Since the choice of the cut-off point is arbitrary, it is meaningful to understand how the 
model classified the defaulted banks two years prior failure by ranking the banks. From 
the panel regressions we obtain the individual probability of failure of each bank. Banks 
are then ranked using their fitted probability values from the less risky to the riskiest. 
The following step consider the actual occurrence of failure to see if the model classify 
the defaulted banks into one of the five highest probability deciles two years prior failure. 
The following table reports the results.    
< Insert Table 9 > 
6.1 Robustness test 
The results obtained through the estimation process depend on the data utilized and the 
method employed. Therefore, in order to get more generalized results, robustness tests 
are run to check for the predictive capacity of the model. 
Out-of-sample data would permit to tackle the data-dependency issue. However, the 
model is estimated on the whole population therefore no out-of-sample data are 
available. In order to tackle the problem, rolling window estimation is employed. The 
method starts with determining the sample window to estimate the probability of 
default. Since a fair number of defaults must be considered for the estimation , a sample 
window of seven years is chosen. Then, moving up the window by one year, it is possible 
to get the risk forecast for the second period. For the ease of exposure, the following 
                                                                                                                                                                              
∑
=
−=
n
j
jjp
n
B
1
2)(1 θ  
where p0, p1,..., pn, are the estimated default probabilities of the banks and θj is the actual outcome of the event of 
default (it equals 1 if obligor j defaults and 0 otherwise). It follows that the Brier score is always between zero and one. 
The closer the Brier score is to zero the better is the forecast of default probabilities. 
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  The Wilks’ Lambda gives a measure of the success rate of a model: 
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where z  represents the mean of zi in the entire sample of healthy and defaulted banks. The higher the ratio, the lower 
the discriminant capacity of the model. 
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tables present the results per period of the employed technique using only the 
traditional random effects logit estimator and all the available information. 
< Insert Table 10 > 
The results confirm that, even considering a different estimation window, the covariates 
that are significant in the previous regressions remain as such, what brings to more 
robust results. Moreover, looking at the goodness-of fit measure, the ROC area statistic is 
fairly high compared with previous estimations. It is also important to notice that the 
main variable of the analysis (the local environmental indicator) keep being statistically 
significant under different time windows. 
The reason of the methodological choice derives from the available data and from the 
procedures employed in previous studies. As a consequence, it is interesting to check 
whether the results are still valid when some aspects of the methodology change. 
Furthermore, this test provides a useful assessment of the specific results obtained 
through the model and they offer more support to the inference. As a consequence, it is 
assumed a different lag in the observation of explanatory variables. By changing the lag it 
is possible to establish if the regressors are still significant and accurate with a different 
time to default. Following the general approach employed in similar previous studies19 ,a 
one-year lag (t-1) and a three-year lag (t-3) are considered in the test of robustness20. 
For the sake of the argument, it is of utmost importance to remark that by changing the 
time lag of the relationship between the covariates and the dependent variable, we are 
changing the forecast horizon. 
< Insert Table 11 > 
The local economic variable is statistically significant in all the regressions. The variable 
performs very well considering every time period. The capital adequacy ratio seems to 
be fairly stable and it is not dropped from any specification either. Nevertheless, the 
model does not perform very well when the time lag is one year. Only three variables are 
not dropped from the analysis. There are a number of possible explanations for such 
                                                        
19
 Among the others, Vulpes (1999), Guidi (2005), Canbas et al. (2005). 
20
  As noted by Varetto (1999), time lags greater than t-3 (like t-4 and t-5) cast some doubts on the effective degree of 
realism of the models. 
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result. One of these is given by the fact that the low number of defaults (27 when we 
consider a one-year lag) can have some negative effect on the discriminatory power of 
the variables. In addition, data mining can be a very common phenomenon when the 
time to default gets closer, in that decreasing the reliability of the accounting information.  
Looking at the three years lag estimation, the general macroeconomic variable is also 
dropped from the model. The significance of the other variables confirms the previous 
results. The sample default rate is again low (0.007) but possibly the data mining 
phenomenon does not take place. The local macroeconomic variable keeps being 
significant denoting a strong relationship with the occurrence of the event of default. 
7 Conclusions 
The research developed a descriptive analysis of the main drivers of risk for the Italian 
Cooperative Banks. A panel binary model is proposed since the main goal is to examine 
the relationship between the available information (macroeconomic and accounting 
information) and the probability of default across unit (banks) over time. Moreover, 
macroeconomic information is designed to take into account the specific characteristic of 
the CBs’ operating environment. The model is estimated with a set of banks’ default 
observed over eight years. 
The study brings different results. The most important finding is that the local economic 
environment affects CB probability of default. The variable employed as a proxy of the 
local economic conditions performs very well both in univariate context 21  and 
multivariate analysis. Moreover, these results are robust to different timing 
specifications and a different characterization of the employed method. In addition, the 
local economic variable synthesise the mechanism related to the boom and bust cycle. 
Finally, the specific legal and environmental conditions under which CBs operate permit 
to gauge the heterogeneity of Italian regions through the usage of nonbank data. 
The capital adequacy indicator has the most significant relationship with the probability 
of default. This finding confirms, as already noticed in previous studies, the fact that 
Italian Cooperative banks are well capitalized financial institution and that this feature 
                                                        
21
 Data are available from the author upon request. 
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helps in lowering their probability of default. Also the balance-sheet structure, the 
performance and the liquidity ratios are fairly significant. Nonetheless, these variables 
present unstable results when they are subject to the test of robustness.   
There are some potential drawbacks in terms of interpreting the results. Since the 
variables do not have the same unit measure, it is difficult to understand which one 
contributes more to the probability of default. In addition, it is not possible to determine 
if a significant variable is more useful in identifying failed banks as opposed to non-failed 
banks (i.e., no information is available about a variable’s ability to reduce Type I versus 
Type II errors). Moreover, the model does not determine which of the variables is “out of 
line” for a particular bank, which must be discerned in a univariate context by 
comparison of mean values of variables in failed versus non-failed banks. In addition, the 
model should be tested out-of-sample to check for its predictive power. Finally, the 
absence of a clear theory of bank-failure makes arbitrary the choice of the covariates 
explaining the event of default. Nevertheless, the study represents a step forward in 
determining the main drivers of risk that affect the probability of default of small banks 
and in assessing the possible usage of nonbank data to assess the impact of adverse 
environmental shocks. 
In conclusion, further adjustments should be done in order to utilize macroeconomic 
factors as control variables. The results show that regional macroeconomic time series 
data contribute to the explanation of the happening of small banks’ default. Since the lack 
of bank failures did not permit to carry on extensive analysis on the issue, the use of 
other external data sources may be of help to test the predictive ability of the model in 
holdout samples. In particular, a cross country analysis could support and generalize the 
hypothesized relationship between the local environment and the risk of default of small 
banks. Another further development regards the usage of a different technique of 
analysis. One possible development is the usage of asymmetric distributions (i.e. the 
Weibull distribution), in order to take into account for the intrinsic features of systemic 
risk in the banking sector. Another possibility considers that if from one hand CBs’ 
operations are geographically limited by the banking law, on the other hand the 
protection scheme (Fondo Garanzia Depositanti, Fondo Garanzia Obbligazionisti and 
Fondo di Garanzia Istituzionale) guarantees that the influence of local market risk is 
softened by the presence of this “safety net”. Then it would be interesting to analyze CB’s 
 17 
performance using a portfolio approach and see whether local market risk is still a 
relevant driver of risk.  
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9 Tables 
Table 1:“Number of banks and sample default rates” 
 SAMPLE 
HISTORICAL 
Year Number # Default* Default rate Number of 
banks 
# Default** Default rate 
1997 531 4 0.75% 591 8 1.35% 
1998 512 5 0.98% 583 8 1.37% 
1999 485 4 0.82% 562 8 1.42% 
2000 476 6 1.26% 531 6 1.13% 
2001 458 7 1.53% 499 5 1.00% 
2002 439 2 0.46% 474 6 1.27% 
2003 425 4 0.94% 461 7 1.52% 
2004 422 2 0.47% 445 2 0.45% 
Total 3748 34 0.91% 4.146 50 1.21% 
Source: own calculations using data from Federcasse 
* The number of defaults refer to the predetermined lag structure (i.e. 1997 failures are banks underwent in default in 1999). 
** Banks failed in the correspondent year. 
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Table 2:”Explanatory variables considered in the specification” 
Ratio Economic meaning  Y=0 Y=1 
Mean St dev Mean St dev 
Profit after tax / Total assets How profitable is a company 
relative to its total assets 
0.008 0.008 0.006* 0.018 
Interest-bearing assets / 
Total assets 
Percentage of the total assets 
that provides interest income 
0.940 0.023 0.919 0.036 
Capital in excess of 
regulatory requirements / 
Minimum capital 
requirements 
Percentage of capital in 
excess of regulatory 
requirements 
1.747 1.407 1.286 1.968 
Loan-loss provisions/ Non 
performing loans 
Size of losses compared with 
the amount of riskiest loans 
0.102 0.324 0.906 3.790 
Staff costs / Number of staff Overhead factor that each 
employee carries 
55.108 6.931 49.104 11.988 
Interest bearing liabilities / 
Cash and cash equivalents 
Ability of the institution to 
meet projected obligations 
with the available liquidity 
7.737 18.851 17.259 22.122 
Inflation rate Business cycle indicator 2.135 0.402 2.206 0.429 
Growth in personal income 
(regional figures calculated 
on a two-year basis) 
Regional environmental 
variable 
8.216 6.258 13.177 6.438 
Source: own calculations using data from Federcasse 
* Multiplied by hundred 
  
 24 
Table 3:“Pattern of cross-sectional time-series data” 
Frequency % Cumul. % Pattern 
359 59% 59.44 11111111 
38 6% 65.73 11…… 
35 6% 71.52 111….. 
27 4% 75.99 1111…. 
26 4% 80.3 1……. 
20 3% 83.61 11111… 
18 3% 86.59 ...11111 
12 2% 88.58 ..111111 
10 2% 90.23 111111.. 
7 1% 91.39 ....1111 
52 9% 100 (other patterns) 
604 100% - - 
Source: own calculations using data from Federcasse 
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Table 4:“Number of CB per year and geographical area” 
Area 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 Total 
Center 87 85 78 87 83 85 81 81 667 
North-East 236 228 219 212 206 194 188 186 1669 
North-West 78 73 68 64 61 59 58 57 518 
South 130 126 120 113 108 101 98 98 894 
Total 531 512 485 476 458 439 425 422 3748 
Center: Abruzzo, Lazio, Marche, Toscana, Umbria 
North-East: Emilia Romagna, Friuli Venezia Giulia, Trentino Alto Adige, Veneto 
North-West: Liguria, Lombardia, Piemonte, Valle d'Aosta 
South: Basilicata, Calabria, Campania, Molise, Puglia, Sardegna, Sicilia 
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Table 5:”Number of CB per year and geographical area” 
Area 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 Total 
Center 87 85 78 87 83 85 81 81 667 
North-East 236 228 219 212 206 194 188 186 1669 
North-West 78 73 68 64 61 59 58 57 518 
South 130 126 120 113 108 101 98 98 894 
Total 531 512 485 476 458 439 425 422 3748 
Center: Abruzzo, Lazio, Marche, Toscana, Umbria 
North-East: Emilia Romagna, Friuli Venezia Giulia, Trentino Alto Adige, Veneto 
North-West: Liguria, Lombardia, Piemonte, Valle d'Aosta 
South: Basilicata, Calabria, Campania, Molise, Puglia, Sardegna, Sicilia 
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Table 6: “Traditional random effects model” 
VARIABLES LOGIT PROBIT 
  Dependent Variable: Event of Default 
 (1.1) (2.1) (1.2) (2.2) 
Profit after tax / Total assets -29.581 -34.051 -17.498  
 (-1.66) (-1.92) (-1.72)  
Interest-bearing assets / Total assets -23.986 -23.366 -11.832 -13.524 
 (-3.66)** (-3.58)** (-2.78)** (-3.05)** 
Capital in excess of regulatory requirements / 
Minimum capital requirements 
-0.672 -0.691 -0.374 -0.408 
 (-3.17)** (-3.27)** (-2.51)* (-2.51)* 
Loan-loss provisions/ Non performing loans 0.899  0.551 0.677 
 (1.57)  (1.63) (1.99)* 
Staff costs / Number of staff -0.074 -0.072 -0.040 -0.045 
 (-3.21)** (-3.14)** (-2.66)** (-2.83)** 
Interest bearing liabilities / Cash and cash 
equivalents 
0.024 0.026 0.015 0.017 
 (2.49)* (2.8)** (2.43)* (2.72)** 
Inflation rate 0.995 1.008 0.533 0.602 
 (2.13)* (2.17)* (1.88) (2.03)* 
Growth in personal income (regional figures 
calculated on a two-year basis) 
0.082 0.083 0.053 0.057 
 (2.94)** (3)** (2.48)* (2.53)* 
Constant 19.093 18.518 8.822 10.218 
 (3.05)** (2.98)** (2.26)* (2.52)* 
Observations 3748 3748 3748 3748 
Number of banks 604 604 604 604 
Notes: Absolute value of z statistics in parentheses.* and ** indicates that the individual coefficient is statistically significant at the 5 and 1% level 
respectively using a two-sided test. The number associated with each column (i.e. 3.1) indicates the specification (i.e. 3) and the model employed (i.e. 1. 
traditional random effects logit, 2. traditional random effects probit). 
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Table 7: “Empirical and expected sign of the relationship between the explanatory 
variables and the response variable” 
Variables Source Exp. 
Effect 
Set of 
covariates 
      1 2 
Profit after tax / Total assets Logan (2001), Crowley, 
Loviscek (1990) 
- - - 
Interest-bearing assets / Total assets Tutino et al (2005) - - - 
Capital in excess of reg. requirements / 
Min capital requirements 
Logan (2001) - - - 
Loan-loss provisions/ Non performing 
loans 
Nadotti (1995) + + + 
Staff costs / Number of staff Tutino et al (2005) - - - 
Interest bearing liabilities / Cash and 
cash equivalents 
Nadotti (1995) + + + 
Inflation rate Porath (2006), Demirguc-Kunt 
,Detragiache (1998) 
+ + + 
Growth in personal income (regional 
figures calculated on a two-year basis) 
Nuxoll et al (2003), Glass, 
McKillop (2006), Hahn (2007) 
-/+  + + 
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Table 8: “Measures of goodness-of-fit” 
 
MEASURE LOGIT 
MODEL 
PROBIT 
MODEL 
  Random Effects  
  1.2 2.2 
Sensitivity 0.706 0.412 
Specificity 0.838 0.957 
Correctly classified 0.837 0.952 
ROC area 0.874 0.873 
McFadden's R2 0.196 0.209 
Brier score* 0.868 0.884 
Wilks' lambda 0.962 0.976 
Source: own calculations 
* Multiplied by hundred 
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Table 9: “Fitted accuracy of the estimated probability of default on the actual 
bankruptcies*” 
RANDOM EFFECTS MODEL 
 DECILE** LOGIT PROBIT 
1 - 5 5.9 2.9 
6 2.9 0.0 
7 2.9 11.8 
8 11.8 11.8 
9 17.6 14.7 
10 58.8 58.8 
Source: own calculations 
* Probability rankings versus actual 
bankruptcies; percent classified out of 34 
possible. 
** Deciles of the distribution of estimated 
probability of default. 
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Table 10: “Rolling window estimation using random effects logit regression and all the 
available information” 
VARIABLES RANDOM EFFECTS LOGIT 
  Dep. Variable: Event of Default 
 
1997 – 2003 1998 - 2004 
Profit after tax / Total assets -28.042 -34.843 
 
(-1.59) (-1.79) 
Interest-bearing assets / Total assets -22.520 -24.950 
 
(-3.37)** (-3.40)** 
Capital in excess of regulatory requirements / 
Minimum capital requirements 
-0.583 -0.639 
 
(-2.83)** (-3.06)** 
Loan-loss provisions/ Non performing loans 1.052 0.797 
 
(1.87) (1.36) 
Staff costs / Number of staff -0.061 -0.067 
 
(-2.58)** (-2.64)** 
Interest bearing liabilities / Cash and cash 
equivalents 
0.024 0.029 
 
(2.58)** (2.96)** 
Inflation rate 0.939 0.837 
 
(2.00)* (1.67) 
Growth in personal income (regional figures 
calculated on a two-year basis) 
0.082 0.070 
 
(3.02)** (2.35)* 
Constant 17.144 20.088 
 
(2.71)** (2.8)** 
Observations 3326 3217 
Number of banks 601 578 
Sensitivity 0.688 0.633 
Specificity 0.808 0.839 
Correctly classified 0.807 0.837 
ROC area 0.882 0.881 
Notes: Absolute value of z statistics in parentheses.* and ** indicates that the individual coefficient is statistically 
significant at the 5 and 1% level respectively using a two-sided test. 
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Table 11: “Estimation results using random effects logit regression and considering a 
different lag structure” 
VARIABLES LOGIT 
  Dependent Variable: Event of Default 
 (1 year) (2 years) (3 years) 
Profit after tax / Total assets -96.858 -29.994 -47.141 
 (-4.06)** (-1.68) (-2.26)* 
Interest-bearing assets / Total assets -12.058 -23.987 -18.005 
 (-1.46) (-3.66)** (-2.21)* 
Capital in excess of regulatory requirements / 
Minimum capital requirements 
-0.702 -0.665 -0.673 
 (-2.53)* (-3.15)** (-2.75)** 
Loan-loss provisions/ Non performing loans 0.623 0.908 -1.336 
 (0.97) (1.59) (-0.99) 
Staff costs / Number of staff -0.038 -0.074 -0.059 
 (-1.46) (-3.19)** (-2.17)* 
Interest bearing liabilities / Cash and cash 
equivalents 
0.008 0.024 0.014 
 (0.64) (2.48)* (1.08) 
Inflation rate 0.815 0.999 0.187 
 (1.5) (2.14)* (0.36) 
Growth in personal income (regional figures 
calculated on a two-year basis) 
0.076 0.082 0.078 
 (1.97)* (2.97)** (2.56)* 
Constant 6.584 19.042 14.745 
 (0.82) (3.05)** (1.88) 
Observations 3775 3748 3714 
Number of banks 608 604 596 
Sample default rate 0.007 0.009 0.007 
Notes: Absolute value of z statistics in parentheses.* and ** indicates that the individual coefficient is statistically significant at the 5 
and 1% level respectively using a two-sided test. 
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10 Figures 
Figure 1: Average total assets(*) and number of branches per year and geographical area  
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